Talk:Emergence (biology): Difference between revisions
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I am concerned that the section [[Emergence_(biology)#Why_emergence|Why emergence?]], and perhaps this entire article, is phrased too much in the manner of presenting an established predominating view, when it should be presented as simply one point of view, and contrasting views should be presented as well. Although a vast number of proponents can be cited, in my opinion this topic suffers from the exploitation by some of ambiguity and vague terminology to advance mysticism. [[User:John R. Brews|John R. Brews]] 14:49, 27 August 2012 (UTC) | I am concerned that the section [[Emergence_(biology)#Why_emergence|Why emergence?]], and perhaps this entire article, is phrased too much in the manner of presenting an established predominating view, when it should be presented as simply one point of view, and contrasting views should be presented as well. Although a vast number of proponents can be cited, in my opinion this topic suffers from the exploitation by some of ambiguity and vague terminology to advance mysticism. [[User:John R. Brews|John R. Brews]] 14:49, 27 August 2012 (UTC) | ||
This section is far too assertive about what is mere conjecture. The statement: | |||
:"One reason: the intrinsic properties of a system’s components cannot themselves determine those of the whole system; rather, their 'organizational dynamics' does — how the components interact coordinately in time and space. Those organizational dynamics include not only the interrelations among the components themselves, but also interactions among the many different organizational units in the system." | |||
is a bald assertion without foundation. The source describing "organicism (materialistic holism)" is hokum, I'm afraid. [[User:John R. Brews|John R. Brews]] 16:56, 27 August 2012 (UTC) | |||
== Role of closed systems == | == Role of closed systems == |
Revision as of 11:56, 27 August 2012
Skeptics
Hi Anthony:
While it is beyond debate that systems can be described in language that has no meaning when applied to their constituent subsystems, things like temperature and possibly consciousness, the idea of emergence seems to be just another name for these system properties with the addition of some "magical" elements about the amazing appearance of new properties. To my mind the microscopic behavior of atoms in a gas is more fundamental than some average that we call "temperature", or some property that we call "heat". It is obvious that thermodynamics gets along with such concepts just fine (within its domain of applicability, which excludes things like fluctuations about the mean), and it doesn't have to refer to its underpinnings in statistical mechanics. However, the use of thermodynamics to explain a situation instead of a complete microscopic analysis based upon atomic motions or maybe the Standard model is simply an economy of thought, made necessary by the limited capacity of the human mind and its computer agents, and not the emergence of a whole greater than the sum of its parts.
I'd argue that the notion of " inexplicably unpredicted novel properties, functions and behaviors, ones not observed in the system's subsystems and their components, and not explainable or predictable from complete understanding the components' properties/functions/behaviors considered in isolation from the system that embeds them." is a set with zero members. John R. Brews 14:00, 27 August 2012 (UTC)
Here is a discussion of "emergent" gravity as a macroscopic version of a more microscopic theory. Here is a more general presentation of the relation between macro-theories and micro-theories.
in contrast we have this from Answers.com ( a reputable source?):
- "Macroevolution, in all its possible meanings, implies the emergence of new complex functions. A function is not the simplistic sum of a great number of "elementary" sub-functions: sub-functions have to be interfaced and coherently integrated to give a smoothly performing whole. In the same way, macroevolution is not the mere sum of elementary microevolutionary events."
I am afraid that this kind of "thinking" flourishes in the mystical environment of emergence. John R. Brews 14:32, 27 August 2012 (UTC)
And we have this:
- "In the absence of a dialectical understanding of human history, the question whether individuals create social reality or vice versa continues to shape sociological theory construction. Is society a sui generis, transcendent reality which coercively shapes human behavior or is it, instead, simply equal to the sum of individual actions? Can social facts be explained only by other social facts or does explanation require, to be valid, that social facts be reduced to micro-level explanations?"
which has the merit of posing a question, not making an assertion. John R. Brews 15:06, 27 August 2012 (UTC)
Why emergence?
I am concerned that the section Why emergence?, and perhaps this entire article, is phrased too much in the manner of presenting an established predominating view, when it should be presented as simply one point of view, and contrasting views should be presented as well. Although a vast number of proponents can be cited, in my opinion this topic suffers from the exploitation by some of ambiguity and vague terminology to advance mysticism. John R. Brews 14:49, 27 August 2012 (UTC)
This section is far too assertive about what is mere conjecture. The statement:
- "One reason: the intrinsic properties of a system’s components cannot themselves determine those of the whole system; rather, their 'organizational dynamics' does — how the components interact coordinately in time and space. Those organizational dynamics include not only the interrelations among the components themselves, but also interactions among the many different organizational units in the system."
is a bald assertion without foundation. The source describing "organicism (materialistic holism)" is hokum, I'm afraid. John R. Brews 16:56, 27 August 2012 (UTC)
Role of closed systems
The example provided of studying a protein separated from the cellular system that embeds it in a cell, and the proposed inadequacy of this study to "explaining any of the properties it has in the context of the system that embeds it" may point simply to the failure to properly identify the "system". This idea of how to identify a closed system may be a better entry point into "emergence" than the identification of magical properties.
If two systems are coupled, each may impact the other, and the analysis of the pair must involve this coupling. We have a feedback arrangement, and although each system may be completely described in terms of its response to arbitrary inputs, when these inputs are generated by another system that responds to the first, the solution to this coupled-system behavior may be much easier to describe in new terminology.
An example might be the vibrations of a crystal lattice, usually described in terms of phonons, entities describing vibrations of the crystal as a whole. It remains the case however, that a description in terms of individual atomic properties can be recovered from the phonon picture, and the two descriptions are simply different perspectives on the same phenomena, of which one or the other may be more practical in a given situation, somewhat analogous to an architect's sketch being more useful in presenting a proposal to a layman than a mechanical drawing of its floor plan. John R. Brews 15:27, 27 August 2012 (UTC)
Some changes
I've made a few changes to separate the concept of emergence from the characterization as "unpredictable", to leave that as a possible but not required property of emergence. John R. Brews 16:40, 27 August 2012 (UTC)