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Putnam. 1993. Making Democracy Work. Princeton: Princeton Universitiy Press. | Putnam. 1993. Making Democracy Work. Princeton: Princeton Universitiy Press. | ||
* The conclusion, and Putnam's argument that social capital is a necessary ingredient for government functioning. It's a bit unclear on causality here, which he acknowledges: although the differing patterns of social capital in the north and south are largely due to centuries of history (thus dooming the institutional reform, one might think), Putnam also says that the changed institutions will have a gradual (perhaps imperceptible in the short term) effect on improving social capital. | * The conclusion, and Putnam's argument that social capital is a necessary ingredient for government functioning. It's a bit unclear on causality here, which he acknowledges: although the differing patterns of social capital in the north and south are largely due to centuries of history (thus dooming the institutional reform, one might think), Putnam also says that the changed institutions will have a gradual (perhaps imperceptible in the short term) effect on improving social capital. | ||
* At the same time, he views social capital as simply one of two equilibria: either societies choose "always defect" in their daily collective action problems, or they choose "always return favors," thus building social capital and general trust. Keep in mind: like all equilibria, these are self-reinforcing. That means that saying institutions cause social capital which reinforces institutions isn't necessarily circular; any equilibrium is circular in that sense, since being in the equilibrium increases the probability that you will stay there. | |||
Revision as of 08:52, 3 January 2010
Putnam. 1993. Making Democracy Work. Princeton: Princeton Universitiy Press.
- The conclusion, and Putnam's argument that social capital is a necessary ingredient for government functioning. It's a bit unclear on causality here, which he acknowledges: although the differing patterns of social capital in the north and south are largely due to centuries of history (thus dooming the institutional reform, one might think), Putnam also says that the changed institutions will have a gradual (perhaps imperceptible in the short term) effect on improving social capital.
- At the same time, he views social capital as simply one of two equilibria: either societies choose "always defect" in their daily collective action problems, or they choose "always return favors," thus building social capital and general trust. Keep in mind: like all equilibria, these are self-reinforcing. That means that saying institutions cause social capital which reinforces institutions isn't necessarily circular; any equilibrium is circular in that sense, since being in the equilibrium increases the probability that you will stay there.
Ostrom, Elinor, 1990, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press).