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'''Moral responsibility''' is an assignment of a duty or obligation to behave in a 'good' manner and refrain from behaving in a 'bad' manner. From a philosophical standpoint, the rationale behind 'good' and 'bad' is a subject for [[ethics]]<ref name=Shoemaker> | '''Moral responsibility''' is an assignment of a duty or obligation to behave in a 'good' manner and refrain from behaving in a 'bad' manner. From a philosophical standpoint, the rationale behind 'good' and 'bad' is a subject for [[ethics]]<ref name=Shoemaker> | ||
{{cite web |author=David Shoemaker |title=Personal Identity and Ethics |work=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition) |editor=Edward N. Zalta, ed |date=Feb 13, 2012 |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-ethics/ }} | {{cite web |author=David Shoemaker |title=Personal Identity and Ethics |work=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition) |editor=Edward N. Zalta, ed |date=Feb 13, 2012 |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-ethics/ }} | ||
</ref> and [[metaethics]].<ref name=SayreMcCord | </ref> and [[metaethics]].<ref name=SayreMcCord/> Stent provides four conditions for assigning moral responsibility, among them the "duties and obligations devolving from moral, legal, or ritual imperatives".<ref name=Stent/> In everyday life, obligation in this context is distinguished in part from milder demands for conformity like etiquette by the intense and insistent social pressure brought to bear upon those who deviate or threaten to deviate.<ref name=Hart0> | ||
{{cite book |author=HLA Hart |title=The Concept of Law |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=53u8K7jNGioC&pg=PA86&lpg=PA86 |page=86 |isbn=0199644705 |year=2012 |publisher= Oxford University Press |edition=3rd }} Reprint of 1961 edition with introduction by Leslie Greene. | {{cite book |author=HLA Hart |title=The Concept of Law |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=53u8K7jNGioC&pg=PA86&lpg=PA86 |page=86 |isbn=0199644705 |year=2012 |publisher= Oxford University Press |edition=3rd }} Reprint of 1961 edition with introduction by Leslie Greene. | ||
</ref> From an anthropological or sociological standpoint, the specifics of what is 'good' or 'bad', and the ways of enforcing acceptable behavior, vary considerably from one group to another.<ref name=Kleinman> | </ref> From an anthropological or sociological standpoint, the specifics of what is 'good' or 'bad', and the ways of enforcing acceptable behavior, vary considerably from one group to another.<ref name=Kleinman> | ||
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A large part of the philosophical discussion of 'moral responsibility' is focused upon the logical implications (as distinct from the ascertainable facts, such as they may be) of whether or not humans actually are able to control their actions to some or another extent.<ref name=Vargas> | A large part of the philosophical discussion of 'moral responsibility' is focused upon the logical implications (as distinct from the ascertainable facts, such as they may be) of whether or not humans actually are able to control their actions to some or another extent.<ref name=Vargas> | ||
{{cite book |title=Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility |author=Manuel Vargas |quote=[There are] other legitimate worries one can have about responsibility. For example, one could be worried about the consequences of reductionism of the mental (including whether our minds do anything, or whether they are epiphenomenal byproducts of more basic causal processes). Alternately, one might be worried that specific results in some or another science (usually, neurology but sometimes psychology) show that we lack some crucial power necessary for moral responsibility....|isbn=0191655775 |year=2013 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=S21oAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA10&lpg=PA10 |pages=p. 10}} | {{cite book |title=Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility |author=Manuel Vargas |quote=[There are] other legitimate worries one can have about responsibility. For example, one could be worried about the consequences of reductionism of the mental (including whether our minds do anything, or whether they are epiphenomenal byproducts of more basic causal processes). Alternately, one might be worried that specific results in some or another science (usually, neurology but sometimes psychology) show that we lack some crucial power necessary for moral responsibility....|isbn=0191655775 |year=2013 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=S21oAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA10&lpg=PA10 |pages=p. 10}} | ||
</ref><ref name=Cane0 | </ref><ref name=Cane0/> Resolution of that issue is the philosophical subject of [[free will]], a continuing debate that began millennia ago and seems destined to continue indefinitely. It is known that humans' control over their actions is limited in some circumstances, and there is debate over the role of moral responsibility where there is only curtailed agency. | ||
''[[Moral responsibility|.... (read more)]]'' | ''[[Moral responsibility|.... (read more)]]'' | ||
Revision as of 09:23, 9 March 2014
Moral responsibility
Moral responsibility is an assignment of a duty or obligation to behave in a 'good' manner and refrain from behaving in a 'bad' manner. From a philosophical standpoint, the rationale behind 'good' and 'bad' is a subject for ethics[1] and metaethics.[2] Stent provides four conditions for assigning moral responsibility, among them the "duties and obligations devolving from moral, legal, or ritual imperatives".[3] In everyday life, obligation in this context is distinguished in part from milder demands for conformity like etiquette by the intense and insistent social pressure brought to bear upon those who deviate or threaten to deviate.[4] From an anthropological or sociological standpoint, the specifics of what is 'good' or 'bad', and the ways of enforcing acceptable behavior, vary considerably from one group to another.[5]
- "Social learning theorists...feel that the learning of moral rules is not culturally invariant, but is, rather, critically related to particular learning environments and to the distinctive normative code of the society in question. The major influences on moral development are what B.F. Skinner calls "contingencies of reinforcement"...culturally variable factors that explain why different peoples acquire different types of moral orientations."
'Moral responsibility' is part of the interplay between the individual and their society, and study of this relationship is both a scientific and a philosophical investigation.[6][7]
- "The study of ethics is concerned not only with identification of societal values but with thinking logically about ethical challenges and developing practical approaches to moral problem solving. Other disciplines also are concerned with discovering society's moral precepts. For example, sociology and anthropology each study cultural norms."[8]
A large part of the philosophical discussion of 'moral responsibility' is focused upon the logical implications (as distinct from the ascertainable facts, such as they may be) of whether or not humans actually are able to control their actions to some or another extent.[9][10] Resolution of that issue is the philosophical subject of free will, a continuing debate that began millennia ago and seems destined to continue indefinitely. It is known that humans' control over their actions is limited in some circumstances, and there is debate over the role of moral responsibility where there is only curtailed agency.
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