Kamikaze: Difference between revisions

From Citizendium
Jump to navigation Jump to search
imported>Howard C. Berkowitz
mNo edit summary
 
(2 intermediate revisions by 2 users not shown)
Line 1: Line 1:
{{subpages}}
{{subpages}}
{{TOC|right}}
'''Kamikaze''' attacks, Japanese for "'''divine wind'''", were the general term for Japanese [[suicide attack]]s, by aircraft, on U.S. ships. They were a subset of the larger program of [[tokko]] suicide weapons and tactics in the air, on land, and sea. Major organized attacks began  T in October 1944 and continued to the end of the war.


The word ''kamikaze'' (Japanese: 神風) was originally used to refer to major typhoons in the years 1274 and 1281. These typhoons dispersed Mongol armadas on their way to an invasion of Japan. As the typhoons were believed to be gifts from the gods, they were given the name ''kamikaze'', from the words ''kami'' for "god", "spirit", and "divinity", and ''kaze'' for "wind".
'''Kamikaze''' attacks, Japanese for "'''divine wind'''"<ref> The word ''kamikaze'' (Japanese: 神風) was originally used to refer to major typhoons in the years 1274 and 1281. These typhoons dispersed Mongol armadas on their way to an invasion of Japan. As the typhoons were believed to be gifts from the gods, they were given the name ''kamikaze'', from the words ''kami'' for "god", "spirit", and "divinity",; and ''kaze'' for "wind".
</ref>, was a tactic of suicide attacks made by Japanese aircraft against Allied targets, near the end of [[World War II, Pacific]]. The attacks began in October 1944 and continued to the end of the war.  


Kamikaze attacks were most important at [[Okinawa, battle of|the Battle of Okinawa]] in spring 1945; during the three-month battle, 4000 kamikaze sorties sank 38 US ships and damaged 368 more, killing 4,900 sailors in the [[United States Fifth Fleet]].  Expecting far more Kamikaze attacks once the main islands of Japan were invaded, the U.S. high command rethought its strategy and used atomic bombs to end the war instead of an invasion.
Kamikaze attacks were most important at [[Okinawa, battle of|the Battle of Okinawa]] in spring 1945; during the three-month battle, 4000 kamikaze sorties sank 38 US ships and damaged 368 more, killing 4,900 sailors in the American 5th Fleet.  Expecting far more Kamikaze attacks once the main islands of Japan were invaded, the U.S. high command rethought its strategy and used atomic bombs to end the war instead of an invasion.
==Background==
==Background==
In 1944, as Allied forces were advancing towards Japan. Japan's military aircraft, such as the [[A6M (fighter)|A6M Zero]], were completely outclassed by Allied aircraft, including the [[F6F Hellcat]] and the [[F4U Corsair]]. Japan had lost most of its best pilots in air battles against the Allies. Finally, in the [[Battle of the Philippine Sea]], Japan lost a huge number of carrier-based planes, as well as their pilots. One early proposal for suicide tactics came from Captain [[Eiichiro Jo]], naval aide to [[Hirohito|Emperor Hirohito]]. <ref>{{citation
In 1944, as Allied forces were advancing towards Japan. Japan's military aircraft, such as the [[A6M Zero]], were completely outclassed by Allied aircraft, including the [[F6F Hellcat]] and the [[F4U Corsair]]. Japan had lost most of its best pilots in air battles against the Allies. Finally, in the [[Battle of the Philippine Sea]], Japan lost a huge number of carrier-based planes, as well as their pilots. These problems, as well as shortages of fuel and spare parts, led Japan to develop kamikaze tactics, with planes full of explosives, enough fuel for a one-way trip, and a pilot psychologically prepared to die. The Kamikaze attacks worked because the pilot aimed directly at the ship, and did not worry about the trajectory of a bomb, or his escape route. Even if hit his plane continued toward the target.
| url = http://www.japanfocus.org/-Hiroaki-SATO/2662
==Kamikaze aircraft==
| publisher = The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus
Most aircraft used in kamikaze attacks were converted obsolete fighters and dive-bombers. However, purpose-built kamikaze aircraft were also constructed. These included the Yokosuka MXY7 Ohka, nicknamed the "baka bomb" (''baka'' is Japanese for "idiot"), and the Nakajima Ki-115 Tsurugi. The Ohka, effectively a manned cruise missile, was a rocket powered aircraft which was launched from a bomber aircraft. The Tsurugi was an extremely simple aircraft with a wooden fuselage and a reusable undercarriage, designed to use up obsolete engines. In 1945, Japan stockpiled hundreds of planes, Tsurugi, suicide boats, and Ohka for use against the Allied invasion of Japan expected in fall 1945.
| title = Gyokusai or “Shattering like a Jewel”: Reflection on the Pacific War
==Operations==
| author = Hiroaki Sato
If the Americans valued lives over victory, and the Japanese were ready to die for their Emperor, then one radically new and astonishingly effective doctrine suddenly became available to Japan, the Kamikaze attack. Tokyo realized that the old orthodoxy of mass air attack that worked so well at Pearl Harbor now was totally ineffective against superior equipment and tactics; it was therefore necessary to try a desperate doctrine. It could not win the war, but it might lead to a negotiated peace. It capitalized on what Japan considered the sentimental psychological weakness of the Americans. While it failed in the end, it enraged the Americans and indicated that an invasion of Japan would involve hundreds of thousands of casualties on the American side, and millions on the Japanese. Kamikaze pilots were special volunteers, many of them elite students who had just joined the Navy or Army. They were given only rudimentary flight training. After ritual preparation, an experienced escort flyer (who was not a Kamikaze) would lead them toward American ships. Their planes became guided missiles, and only had to be steered at and crashed into a ship.  
}}</ref> Specific tactics were worked out under Vice Admiral [[Takajiro Ohnishi]].


These problems, as well as shortages of fuel and spare parts, led Japan to develop kamikaze tactics, with planes full of explosives, enough fuel for a one-way trip, and a pilot psychologically prepared to die. The Kamikaze attacks worked because they turned basic "dumb" [[gravity bombs]], as well as the kinetic energy and combustible fuel of an aircraft, into a [[precision-guided munition]].  
The suicide doctrine nearly worked. Destroyers and destroyer escorts, doing radar picket duty, were hit hard, as the inexperienced pilots dived at the first American ship they spotted instead of waiting to get at the big carriers. Task Force 58 analyzed the Japanese technique at Okinawa in April, 1945: :Rarely have the enemy attacks been so cleverly executed and made with such reckless determination. These attacks were generally by single or few aircraft making their approaches with radical changes in course and altitude, dispersing when intercepted and using cloud cover to every advantage. They tailed our friendlies home, used decoy planes, and came in at any altitude or on the water.  


Only once in the entire operation did the enemy attack in classic fashion. By attacked in large numbers from different directions at different altitudes, Kamikazes could saturate the CIC command system; there would not be enough Hellcats to shoot them all down. If they managed to get through they could gravely damage a carrier or sink a smaller ship. In the first place they were not planning to return--therefore they were less distracted by AA fire. Hurtling directly at a ship, they were easy to hit, but the dead pilot and crippled plane would still be crashing down toward the target. Desperate high speed twists and turns saved many a ship, but the [[20mm antiaircraft gun|20mm Oerlikon cannon]] proved too weak to knock them down, so [[40mm-56 caliber gun|40mm Bofors]] were hurriedly added to ships. 5" guns with proximity fuzes were highly effective, so hundreds of factories across the USA began round-the-clock production of, with output reaching 40,000 a day.
The best defense against Kamikazes was to knock them out on the ground, or else in the air long before they approached the fleet. The Navy called for more fighters, and more warning. The carriers replaced a fourth of their light bombers with Marine fighters; back home the training of fighter pilots was stepped up. More combat air patrols circling the big ships, more radar picket ships (which themselves became prime targets), and more attacks on airbases and gasoline supplies eventually worked. Japan suspended Kamikaze attacks in May, because it was now hoarding gasoline and hiding planes in preparation for new suicide attacks if the Yankees dared to invade their home islands. The Kamikaze strategy allowed the use of untrained pilots and obsolete planes, and since evasive maneuvering was dropped and there was no return trip, the scarce gasoline reserves could be stretched further. Since pilots guided their airplane/missile all the way to the target, the proportion of hits was much higher than in ordinary bombing. The deaths were not much higher than Japan's conventional air warfare, and much lower than infantry suffered. Japan's industry was manufacturing 1,500 new planes a month, and old inventory was just as good as new. (Better, because the new planes were full of defects, and often crashed while being delivered.)
Japan's new tactics were amazingly effective, and would have been even more devastating but for a serious flaw--Kamikaze doctrine emphasized heroic individual suicide, and overlooked the necessity of saturating the defenses. In six weeks at Okinawa they sent in 1,900 Kamikazes in waves of 2 to 50 planes, sinking 17 destroyers and 19 smaller ships and damaging 368. Some 4,900 American sailors were killed and another 4,800 wounded. However, only four times did the Japanese send in more than 50 planes at one time. On April 6, 107 Kamikazes sank 4 ships and damaged 19, in the worst American defeat since Pearl Harbor. Against small-scale raids the Hellcats and anti-aircraft guns had the time to shoot down over 90 percent of the attackers. A few giant waves of 100+ attackers might have overwhelmed every American defensive system; most of the Kamikazes probably would have gotten through and could have sunk or badly damaged dozens of ships, with American casualties high in the tens of thousands. The Okinawa invasion might have failed. The puzzle is why Japanese Kamikaze doctrine was not fully developed. The coordination of highly complex multiple attacks (using unskilled pilots) would have been a major challenge which might or might not have succeeded, but it was never even attempted. Perhaps the reason was a bureaucratic obstacle. Most air commanders detested the new Kamikaze doctrine because it spelled the imminent end of their air forces; they were reluctant to release the necessary planes, pilots and irreplaceable gasoline reserves. Japanese intelligence failed, for Tokyo kept getting reports every few days that nearly all the American ships had been sunk--again and again! Psychology was a factor as well. The emphasis on ritual suicide for personal and national honor distracted from systematic planning and organization. The volunteers seemed willing enough if there was a reasonable chance of success, but repeated failures gave the lie to the stories about smashing victories, and soon eroded away their esprit. They were in practice not quite so willing to die for their Emperor.
==Philosophy==
Young, well-educated Japanese men volunteered to become kamikaze pilots to express their intense desire to protect their country at all costs and to enjoy the glory that such a sacrifice would afford them in the afterlife.<ref>  G. Miki Hayden, "What Motivated the Kamikazes?" ''Naval History'' 2005 19(2): 22-24. Issn: 1042-1920 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref>
Young, well-educated Japanese men volunteered to become kamikaze pilots to express their intense desire to protect their country at all costs and to enjoy the glory that such a sacrifice would afford them in the afterlife.<ref>  G. Miki Hayden, "What Motivated the Kamikazes?" ''Naval History'' 2005 19(2): 22-24. Issn: 1042-1920 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref>
At first glance, the Kamikaze philosophy was totally opposite from the American cultural norm to stay alive and "let the other guy die for his country." Kamikazes contributed to the intense desire of Washington to end the war off as soon as possible, and lessened any reluctance Americans may have had to exterminate their foes. Notice, however, that while Americans have always been surprised by preplanned suicide attacks (like the truck-bomb that blew up a Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983, the [[9-11 Attack]] in 2001, or the many suicide attacks in Iraq after 2003), the culture did allow for, and approved voluntary suicide. Popular (movie) legend had long glorified the wounded hero who sacrificed himself to save his squad. The Minutemen on Lexington Green, the Texans at the Alamo, the regiments in Pickett's charge, Custer at Little Big Horn, and the sailors and airmen of Taffy 3 at [[Leyte Gulf, battle of|Leyte Gulf]], would have understood the Kamikazes, but they would have demanded a more efficient use of this strange new weapon. In the event, at Okinawa alone five of the eleven American fleet carriers were damaged so severely they were knocked out of the war, together with a battleship, a cruiser, 37 destroyers, two escort carriers, and 24 smaller ships. It was Japan's greatest naval achievement--far more impressive than even Pearl Harbor, but since it lost all its naval capability, and the island itself, Japan lost the [[Okinawa, battle of|Battle of Okinawa]].


Toward the end of the war the Japanese press encouraged civilians to emulate the kamikaze pilots who willingly gave their lives to stop American naval forces. Civilians were told that the reward for such behavior was enshrinement as a warrior-god and spiritual protection in the afterlife.<ref> David C. Earhart, "All Ready to Die: Kamikazefication and Japan's Wartime Ideology." ''Critical Asian Studies'' 2005 37(4): 569-596. Issn: 1467-2715 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]
Toward the end of the war the Japanese press encouraged civilians to emulate the kamikaze pilots who willingly gave their lives to stop American naval forces. Civilians were told that the reward for such behavior was enshrinement as a warrior-god and spiritual protection in the afterlife.<ref> David C. Earhart, "All Ready to Die: Kamikazefication and Japan's Wartime Ideology." ''Critical Asian Studies'' 2005 37(4): 569-596. Issn: 1467-2715 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]
Line 22: Line 28:
</ref>
</ref>


==Kamikaze aircraft==
Most aircraft used in kamikaze attacks were fighters and dive-bombers. However, purpose-built kamikaze aircraft were also constructed.
IJN doctrine teamed Air Fleets, or actual combat aircraft organizations, with Base Air Forces, which were logistical. Fifth Base Air Force, commanded by Vice Admiral [[Heigo Tominaga]] and then Vice Admiral Ohnishi, was the Naval aviation organization specifically responsible for the Phillipines. First Air Fleet was the combat arm.  Under Admiral Kimpei Teraoka, it had moved its headquarters to Clark Field in August and September. Its strength, however, was greatly reduced after the [[Battle of the Philippine Sea]] in June, and U.S. air strikes on the Phillipines in September.  Frustrated pilots had been discussing suicide tactics since 1943. <ref name=DW>{{citation
| title =The Divine Wind: Japan's Kamikaze Force in World War II
  | author =  Rikihei Inoguchi, Tadashi Nakajima, Roger Pineau
| publisher = Naval Institute Press}}, pp. 25-26</ref>
After an inspection trip on October 13, Admiral Toyoda, [[Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet]] replaced Teraoka with Vice Admiral [[Takijiro Ohnishi]] and initially made him responsible for the air aspects of the SHO operation.<ref name=Hoyt>{{citation
| author = Edward P. Hoyt
| title = The Kamikazes
| publisher = Burford Books | year = 1983 | isbn = 1580800319
}}, pp. 22-23</ref> Also on October 13, Rear Admiral Masafuni Arima, had made a suicide dive on the ''USS Franklin'', a carrier bombing Formosa. It was an unauthorized action; Teraoka had told him "When you can show me how to bring the men back from the special attack [called [[tokko]]], then I will listen." <ref>Hoyt, ''The Kamizazes'', pp. 9-12</ref>
Second Air Fleet and Sixth Base Air Force, under Vice Admiral Fukudome, was responsible for southern [[Kyushu]], the Ryukyus, and Formosa. After the Formosa raids, it moved to the Phillipines on October 22.  Fukodome still supported conventional techniques as opposed to Ohnishi's focus on suicide attack.<ref>Hoyt, ''The Kamikazes'', pp. 70-71</ref>
On October 25, Ohnishi, fortified by an interview with the Emperor, offered to accept a subordinate position in a combined organization.  Fukudome was senior to Ohnishi so took control of their merged organization, the Southwest Area Fleet Combined Land Based Air Force, but with a significant compromise: <ref name=Fukudome>{{citation
| id =INTERROGATION NAV NO. 115/USSBS NO. 503
| title =    Interrogation of: Vice Admiral FUKUDOME, Shigeru, IJN
| date = 9-12 December 1945
| publisher = U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey
| url = http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS/IJO/IJO-115.html}}</ref> Fukudome would accept the [[kamikaze]] principle, although some of the Second Air Fleet units could keep conventional missions. <ref>Hoyt, ''The Kamikazes'', pp. 80-84</ref>
===Adapting standard aircraft===
Fighters were preferred. <ref>Hoyt, ''The Kamikazes'', pp. 47-48</ref>
===Purpose-built aircraft===
These included the Yokosuka MXY7 Ohka, nicknamed the "baka bomb" (''baka'' is Japanese for "idiot"), and the Nakajima Ki-115 Tsurugi.
The Ohka, effectively a manned cruise missile, was a rocket powered aircraft which was launched from a bomber aircraft. The Tsurugi was an extremely simple aircraft with a wooden fuselage and a reusable undercarriage, designed to use up obsolete engines. In 1945, Japan stockpiled hundreds of planes, Tsurugi, suicide boats, and Ohka for use against the Allied invasion of Japan expected in fall 1945.


==Bibliography==
* Burt, Ron. ''Kamikaze Nightmare'' (1995) [http://www.amazon.com/Kamikaze-Nightmare-Ron-Burt/dp/0964614715/ref=sr_1_4?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1213432394&sr=1-4 excerpt and text search]
*  Inoguchi, Rikihei, Tadashi Nakajima, and Roger Pineau. ''The Divine Wind: Japan's Kamikaze Force in World War II'' (1994) [http://www.amazon.com/Divine-Wind-Japans-Kamikaze-Force/dp/155750394X/ref=pd_bbs_3?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1213432137&sr=1-3 excerpt and text search]
* Lamont-Brown, Raymond. ''Kamikaze: Japan's Suicide Samurai'' (2000) [http://www.amazon.com/Kamikaze-Japans-Suicide-Samurai-Cmp/dp/0304352004/ref=sr_1_9?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1213432394&sr=1-9 excerpt and text search]
* Reilly, Robin L. ''Kamikazes, Corsairs And Picket Ships: Okinawa 1945'' (2008)
* Hattori, Syohgo. "Kamikaze: Japan's Glorious Failure." ''Air Power History'' 1996 43(1): 14-27. Issn: 1044-016x


==First major operation: Philippines==
===Primary sources===
Leyte Gulf was the first place at which the Japanese used large [[kamikaze]] forces, starting operations on the 25th. According to Fukudome's operations officer, Ohnishi, who committed ''[[seppuku]]'' at the end of the war, had planned these operations a month earlier. <ref>{{citation
*  Kuwahara, Yasuo, and Gordon T. Allred. ''Kamikaze: A Japanese Pilot's Own Spectacular Story of the Famous Suicide Squadrons'' (2007) [http://www.amazon.com/Kamikaze-Japanese-Spectacular-Suicide-Squadrons/dp/0976154757/ref=pd_bbs_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1213432137&sr=1-1 excerpt and text search]
| url = http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS/IJO/IJO-44.html
*  Ohnuki-Thierney, Emiko, ed. ''Kamikaze Diaries: Reflections of Japanese Student Soldiers'' (2006), 227pp
| title = Interrogation of: Commander YAMAGUCHI, Moriyoshi; from August 1944 to January 1945 Operations Officer on the Staff of Vice Admiral FUKUDOME, CinC Second Air Fleet (FORMOSA), and after 23 October CinC First Combined Base Air Force (LUZON).
| journal = U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey
| id = INTERROGATION NAV NO. 44/USSBS NO. 193
| date = 26 October 1945}}</ref>  These attacks continued well after the main Battle of Leyte, including operations against convoys supporting U.S. land forces.  The first significant attack, which damaged the escort carriers ''USS Santee'' and ''USS Suwanee'', was not stricly part of any of the four major sea battles, although it was on Taffy 1, between 0740 and 0758, while it was supporting the Action off Samar. Lieutenant Yukio Seki led a flight from Macabalat against Taffy 1, and had radioed the position of Taffy 3. Additional kamikazes attacked Taffy 3 at approximately 1030, sinking the ''USS St. Lo'' and damaging the ''USS Kitkun Bay''. <ref>{{citation
| author = William T. Y'Blood
| title = The Little Giants: U.S. Escort Carriers against Japan
| year = 1987
| publisher = U.S. Naval Institute
| isbn = 0870212753
}} pp. 206-219</ref>


====notes====
<references/>


==References==
[[Category:Reviewed Passed]][[Category:Suggestion Bot Tag]]
{{reflist|2}}

Latest revision as of 12:00, 7 September 2024

This article is developing and not approved.
Main Article
Discussion
Related Articles  [?]
Bibliography  [?]
External Links  [?]
Citable Version  [?]
 
This editable Main Article is under development and subject to a disclaimer.

Kamikaze attacks, Japanese for "divine wind"[1], was a tactic of suicide attacks made by Japanese aircraft against Allied targets, near the end of World War II, Pacific. The attacks began in October 1944 and continued to the end of the war.

Kamikaze attacks were most important at the Battle of Okinawa in spring 1945; during the three-month battle, 4000 kamikaze sorties sank 38 US ships and damaged 368 more, killing 4,900 sailors in the American 5th Fleet. Expecting far more Kamikaze attacks once the main islands of Japan were invaded, the U.S. high command rethought its strategy and used atomic bombs to end the war instead of an invasion.

Background

In 1944, as Allied forces were advancing towards Japan. Japan's military aircraft, such as the A6M Zero, were completely outclassed by Allied aircraft, including the F6F Hellcat and the F4U Corsair. Japan had lost most of its best pilots in air battles against the Allies. Finally, in the Battle of the Philippine Sea, Japan lost a huge number of carrier-based planes, as well as their pilots. These problems, as well as shortages of fuel and spare parts, led Japan to develop kamikaze tactics, with planes full of explosives, enough fuel for a one-way trip, and a pilot psychologically prepared to die. The Kamikaze attacks worked because the pilot aimed directly at the ship, and did not worry about the trajectory of a bomb, or his escape route. Even if hit his plane continued toward the target.

Kamikaze aircraft

Most aircraft used in kamikaze attacks were converted obsolete fighters and dive-bombers. However, purpose-built kamikaze aircraft were also constructed. These included the Yokosuka MXY7 Ohka, nicknamed the "baka bomb" (baka is Japanese for "idiot"), and the Nakajima Ki-115 Tsurugi. The Ohka, effectively a manned cruise missile, was a rocket powered aircraft which was launched from a bomber aircraft. The Tsurugi was an extremely simple aircraft with a wooden fuselage and a reusable undercarriage, designed to use up obsolete engines. In 1945, Japan stockpiled hundreds of planes, Tsurugi, suicide boats, and Ohka for use against the Allied invasion of Japan expected in fall 1945.

Operations

If the Americans valued lives over victory, and the Japanese were ready to die for their Emperor, then one radically new and astonishingly effective doctrine suddenly became available to Japan, the Kamikaze attack. Tokyo realized that the old orthodoxy of mass air attack that worked so well at Pearl Harbor now was totally ineffective against superior equipment and tactics; it was therefore necessary to try a desperate doctrine. It could not win the war, but it might lead to a negotiated peace. It capitalized on what Japan considered the sentimental psychological weakness of the Americans. While it failed in the end, it enraged the Americans and indicated that an invasion of Japan would involve hundreds of thousands of casualties on the American side, and millions on the Japanese. Kamikaze pilots were special volunteers, many of them elite students who had just joined the Navy or Army. They were given only rudimentary flight training. After ritual preparation, an experienced escort flyer (who was not a Kamikaze) would lead them toward American ships. Their planes became guided missiles, and only had to be steered at and crashed into a ship.

The suicide doctrine nearly worked. Destroyers and destroyer escorts, doing radar picket duty, were hit hard, as the inexperienced pilots dived at the first American ship they spotted instead of waiting to get at the big carriers. Task Force 58 analyzed the Japanese technique at Okinawa in April, 1945: :Rarely have the enemy attacks been so cleverly executed and made with such reckless determination. These attacks were generally by single or few aircraft making their approaches with radical changes in course and altitude, dispersing when intercepted and using cloud cover to every advantage. They tailed our friendlies home, used decoy planes, and came in at any altitude or on the water.

Only once in the entire operation did the enemy attack in classic fashion. By attacked in large numbers from different directions at different altitudes, Kamikazes could saturate the CIC command system; there would not be enough Hellcats to shoot them all down. If they managed to get through they could gravely damage a carrier or sink a smaller ship. In the first place they were not planning to return--therefore they were less distracted by AA fire. Hurtling directly at a ship, they were easy to hit, but the dead pilot and crippled plane would still be crashing down toward the target. Desperate high speed twists and turns saved many a ship, but the 20mm Oerlikon cannon proved too weak to knock them down, so 40mm Bofors were hurriedly added to ships. 5" guns with proximity fuzes were highly effective, so hundreds of factories across the USA began round-the-clock production of, with output reaching 40,000 a day.

The best defense against Kamikazes was to knock them out on the ground, or else in the air long before they approached the fleet. The Navy called for more fighters, and more warning. The carriers replaced a fourth of their light bombers with Marine fighters; back home the training of fighter pilots was stepped up. More combat air patrols circling the big ships, more radar picket ships (which themselves became prime targets), and more attacks on airbases and gasoline supplies eventually worked. Japan suspended Kamikaze attacks in May, because it was now hoarding gasoline and hiding planes in preparation for new suicide attacks if the Yankees dared to invade their home islands. The Kamikaze strategy allowed the use of untrained pilots and obsolete planes, and since evasive maneuvering was dropped and there was no return trip, the scarce gasoline reserves could be stretched further. Since pilots guided their airplane/missile all the way to the target, the proportion of hits was much higher than in ordinary bombing. The deaths were not much higher than Japan's conventional air warfare, and much lower than infantry suffered. Japan's industry was manufacturing 1,500 new planes a month, and old inventory was just as good as new. (Better, because the new planes were full of defects, and often crashed while being delivered.)

Japan's new tactics were amazingly effective, and would have been even more devastating but for a serious flaw--Kamikaze doctrine emphasized heroic individual suicide, and overlooked the necessity of saturating the defenses. In six weeks at Okinawa they sent in 1,900 Kamikazes in waves of 2 to 50 planes, sinking 17 destroyers and 19 smaller ships and damaging 368. Some 4,900 American sailors were killed and another 4,800 wounded. However, only four times did the Japanese send in more than 50 planes at one time. On April 6, 107 Kamikazes sank 4 ships and damaged 19, in the worst American defeat since Pearl Harbor. Against small-scale raids the Hellcats and anti-aircraft guns had the time to shoot down over 90 percent of the attackers. A few giant waves of 100+ attackers might have overwhelmed every American defensive system; most of the Kamikazes probably would have gotten through and could have sunk or badly damaged dozens of ships, with American casualties high in the tens of thousands. The Okinawa invasion might have failed. The puzzle is why Japanese Kamikaze doctrine was not fully developed. The coordination of highly complex multiple attacks (using unskilled pilots) would have been a major challenge which might or might not have succeeded, but it was never even attempted. Perhaps the reason was a bureaucratic obstacle. Most air commanders detested the new Kamikaze doctrine because it spelled the imminent end of their air forces; they were reluctant to release the necessary planes, pilots and irreplaceable gasoline reserves. Japanese intelligence failed, for Tokyo kept getting reports every few days that nearly all the American ships had been sunk--again and again! Psychology was a factor as well. The emphasis on ritual suicide for personal and national honor distracted from systematic planning and organization. The volunteers seemed willing enough if there was a reasonable chance of success, but repeated failures gave the lie to the stories about smashing victories, and soon eroded away their esprit. They were in practice not quite so willing to die for their Emperor.

Philosophy

Young, well-educated Japanese men volunteered to become kamikaze pilots to express their intense desire to protect their country at all costs and to enjoy the glory that such a sacrifice would afford them in the afterlife.[2]

At first glance, the Kamikaze philosophy was totally opposite from the American cultural norm to stay alive and "let the other guy die for his country." Kamikazes contributed to the intense desire of Washington to end the war off as soon as possible, and lessened any reluctance Americans may have had to exterminate their foes. Notice, however, that while Americans have always been surprised by preplanned suicide attacks (like the truck-bomb that blew up a Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983, the 9-11 Attack in 2001, or the many suicide attacks in Iraq after 2003), the culture did allow for, and approved voluntary suicide. Popular (movie) legend had long glorified the wounded hero who sacrificed himself to save his squad. The Minutemen on Lexington Green, the Texans at the Alamo, the regiments in Pickett's charge, Custer at Little Big Horn, and the sailors and airmen of Taffy 3 at Leyte Gulf, would have understood the Kamikazes, but they would have demanded a more efficient use of this strange new weapon. In the event, at Okinawa alone five of the eleven American fleet carriers were damaged so severely they were knocked out of the war, together with a battleship, a cruiser, 37 destroyers, two escort carriers, and 24 smaller ships. It was Japan's greatest naval achievement--far more impressive than even Pearl Harbor, but since it lost all its naval capability, and the island itself, Japan lost the Battle of Okinawa.

Toward the end of the war the Japanese press encouraged civilians to emulate the kamikaze pilots who willingly gave their lives to stop American naval forces. Civilians were told that the reward for such behavior was enshrinement as a warrior-god and spiritual protection in the afterlife.[3]


Bibliography

  • Burt, Ron. Kamikaze Nightmare (1995) excerpt and text search
  • Inoguchi, Rikihei, Tadashi Nakajima, and Roger Pineau. The Divine Wind: Japan's Kamikaze Force in World War II (1994) excerpt and text search
  • Lamont-Brown, Raymond. Kamikaze: Japan's Suicide Samurai (2000) excerpt and text search
  • Reilly, Robin L. Kamikazes, Corsairs And Picket Ships: Okinawa 1945 (2008)
  • Hattori, Syohgo. "Kamikaze: Japan's Glorious Failure." Air Power History 1996 43(1): 14-27. Issn: 1044-016x

Primary sources

  • Kuwahara, Yasuo, and Gordon T. Allred. Kamikaze: A Japanese Pilot's Own Spectacular Story of the Famous Suicide Squadrons (2007) excerpt and text search
  • Ohnuki-Thierney, Emiko, ed. Kamikaze Diaries: Reflections of Japanese Student Soldiers (2006), 227pp

notes

  1. The word kamikaze (Japanese: 神風) was originally used to refer to major typhoons in the years 1274 and 1281. These typhoons dispersed Mongol armadas on their way to an invasion of Japan. As the typhoons were believed to be gifts from the gods, they were given the name kamikaze, from the words kami for "god", "spirit", and "divinity",; and kaze for "wind".
  2. G. Miki Hayden, "What Motivated the Kamikazes?" Naval History 2005 19(2): 22-24. Issn: 1042-1920 Fulltext: Ebsco
  3. David C. Earhart, "All Ready to Die: Kamikazefication and Japan's Wartime Ideology." Critical Asian Studies 2005 37(4): 569-596. Issn: 1467-2715 Fulltext: Ebsco