De-Ba'athification: Difference between revisions
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{{ | After Saddam Hussein took control of Iraq in 1980, the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party, Baa'th in common use, because the only political party; removing the problems of Saddam's regime also meant extirpating the leadership of the party, in the process of '''de-Ba'athification'''. The term is drawn from the denazification in the occupation of Nazi Germany after WWII. | ||
After | |||
De-Ba'athification was clearly US policy, but, as with Nazi Germany, it was also recognized that some party members were nonpolitical but had to be members to hold jobs in the nation's infrastructure. There were, however, disconnects between the policy and implementation of de-Ba'athification, and some of the implementation may have contributed to delays in restoring Iraqi infrastructure. | |||
==Preparation== | ==Preparation== | ||
When | When L. Paul Bremer|L. Paul "Jerry" Bremer prepared to leave for Iraq, on May 9, 2003, Donald Rumsfeld had given him a general directive, "The coalition will actively oppose Saddam Hussein's old enforcers — the Ba'ath Party, the Saddam Fedayeen, etc. We will make it clear that the Coalition will eliminate the remnants of Saddam's regime." According to Bremer, Under Secretary for Policy Douglas Feith showed him a more sweeping order, and suggested Bremer issue the order that day. Bremer responded "Hold on a minute, I agree it's a very important step, so important it should wait 'til I get there." Feith emphasized Rumsfeld's directive that it was to be carried out "even if implementing it caused administrative inconvenience." Bremer saw this as potentially more than inconvenience. <ref name=Bremer>{{citation | ||
| author = | | author = L. Paul Bremer|L. Paul "Jerry" Bremer with Malcolm McDonnell | ||
| title = My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope | | title = My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope | ||
| publisher = Simon & Schuster | year = 2006 | | publisher = Simon & Schuster | year = 2006 | ||
| isbn= 9780743273893}}, pp. 39-40</ref> | | isbn= 9780743273893}}, pp. 39-40</ref> | ||
Within the Iraqi political groups, there was no common belief. The | Within the Iraqi political groups, there was no common belief. The INC and Shi'a parties, backed by civilians in the U.S. Department of Defense, wanted the most stringent policy. The Iraqi National Accord and liberals affiliated with Adnan al-Pachaci accepted the most narrow definition. Jay Garner's ORHA did not address it. It was hard to tell what the Kurdish groups wanted, but Bremer, who had the power, was emphatic on a strict process. <ref name=Allawi>{{citation | ||
| author = | | author = Ali Allawi | ||
| title = The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace | | title = The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace | ||
| publisher = Yale University Press | year = 2007 | isbn = 9780300110159 | | publisher = Yale University Press | year = 2007 | isbn = 9780300110159 | ||
}}, pp. 147-148</ref> Unfortunately, Bremer did not pay attention to the design of the government under Saddam being organized around the party, and structural changes were needed to establish executive groups if there was strong | }}, pp. 147-148</ref> Unfortunately, Bremer did not pay attention to the design of the government under Saddam being organized around the party, and structural changes were needed to establish executive groups if there was strong de-Ba'athification. <ref>Allawi, p. 161</ref> | ||
==Party outlawed== | ==Party outlawed== | ||
On April 16, 2003, GEN | On April 16, 2003, GEN Tommy Franks announced the end of combat. <ref name=Franks>{{citation | ||
| title = American Soldier | | title = American Soldier | ||
| last1 = Franks | first1= Tommy | first2 = Malcolm | last2 = McConnell | | last1 = Franks | first1= Tommy | first2 = Malcolm | last2 = McConnell | ||
| publisher = Regan | year = 2004}}, pp. 528-529</ref> He recommended that only the senior | | publisher = Regan | year = 2004}}, pp. 528-529</ref> He recommended that only the senior Ba'ath Party leadership be blacklisted, on the assumption, much as with the Soviet Communist Party, that Party members ran most of the basic government services. | ||
Nevertheless, the Party was dissolved on May 12, and CENTCOM was faced with the job of creating a new civilian infrastructure. | Nevertheless, the Party was dissolved on May 12, and CENTCOM was faced with the job of creating a new civilian infrastructure. | ||
==Initial policy== | ==Initial policy== | ||
LTG (ret) Jay Garner said that he had protested full | LTG (ret) Jay Garner said that he had protested full de-Ba'athification to Bremer, who said "These are the directions I have. I have directions to execute this...""<ref name=Garner-PBS>{{citation | ||
| url = http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/interviews/garner.html | | url = http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/interviews/garner.html | ||
| contribution = Interview: Lt. General (ret.) Jay Garner | | contribution = Interview: Lt. General (ret.) Jay Garner | ||
Line 31: | Line 30: | ||
| journal = PBS Frontline | date = Aug. 11, 2006}}</ref> | | journal = PBS Frontline | date = Aug. 11, 2006}}</ref> | ||
Garner had experience running humanitarian operations in Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War. Garner said that he always considered himself in a temporary role. He said that Franks had been promised a large number of constabulary from other nations; his immediate goal, before | Garner had experience running humanitarian operations in Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War. Garner said that he always considered himself in a temporary role. He said that Franks had been promised a large number of constabulary from other nations; his immediate goal, before de-Ba'athification, was "...setting up to pay the civil servants and the police and the pensioners. ORHA, however, never really was operational. It was caught, in part, in bureaucratic fighting principally between State and Defense, with some separate positions from Cheney and Rice. | ||
==Effects== | ==Effects== | ||
CPA Order Number 1 set up | CPA Order Number 1 set up de-Ba'athification. It banned the four “Senior Party Member” top Party ranks, removing them from office and banning them from future public employment, regardless of their role in government or their criminal activities: <ref name=CPA-Ord-1>{{citation | ||
| url = http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20030516_CPAORD_1_De-Ba_athification_of_Iraqi_Society_.pdf | | url = http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20030516_CPAORD_1_De-Ba_athification_of_Iraqi_Society_.pdf | ||
| title = De-Ba | | title = De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society | date =16 May 2003 | ||
| author = | | author = L. Paul Bremer | ||
| publisher = | | publisher = Coalition Provisional Authority}}</ref> | ||
*''Udw Qutriyya'' (Regional Command Member) | *''Udw Qutriyya'' (Regional Command Member) | ||
*''Udw Far'' (Branch Member)* | *''Udw Far'' (Branch Member)* | ||
Line 45: | Line 44: | ||
the public sector. Further, those of any rank, who held the top three positions in "every national government ministry, affiliated corporations, and other government institutions (e.g., universities and hospitals)." This affected 400,000 military workers and 100,000 civilians. The key problem was in the second category, who might well have had no role in party leadership. | the public sector. Further, those of any rank, who held the top three positions in "every national government ministry, affiliated corporations, and other government institutions (e.g., universities and hospitals)." This affected 400,000 military workers and 100,000 civilians. The key problem was in the second category, who might well have had no role in party leadership. | ||
Linda Robinson, a journalist and author of ''Tell me how this ends: General Petraeus and the search for a way out of Iraq'', was invited to discuss the general situation with the U.S. Army | Linda Robinson, a journalist and author of ''Tell me how this ends: General Petraeus and the search for a way out of Iraq'', was invited to discuss the general situation with the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. She began saying that the insurgency was caused by the early decisions of the US Coalition Provisional Authority for de-Ba'athification and disbanding of the Iraqi military.<ref name=Robinson-CGSC>{{citation | ||
| url = http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/cgsc/events/MHLS/RobinsonTranscript.doc | | url = http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/cgsc/events/MHLS/RobinsonTranscript.doc | ||
| author = Linda Robinson | | author = Linda Robinson | ||
Line 52: | Line 51: | ||
}}</ref> | }}</ref> | ||
Sanchez agreed that the top leadership levels needed to be removed and "those with blood on their hands held accountable and prosecuted. It was the unilateral firing of almost everyone else that created the real problem." Originally, only Bremer himself had the authority to grant exceptions, but, nine days later, he created an Iraqi De- | Sanchez agreed that the top leadership levels needed to be removed and "those with blood on their hands held accountable and prosecuted. It was the unilateral firing of almost everyone else that created the real problem." Originally, only Bremer himself had the authority to grant exceptions, but, nine days later, he created an Iraqi De-Ba'athification Council reporting directly to him. There were no local-level committees to deal with the "top three positions" in what well might be local organizations. | ||
Further, the Committee was led by | Further, the Committee was led by Ahmed Chalabi's nephew, whose uncle wanted a total purge of Ba'athists. Sanchez told his commanders to continue with locals in office, "Figure out a best you can what functions we need to establish. Get the best people available and let's get these functions back up and running. And for God's sake, keep the schools open and let the kids finished the school year." | ||
Sanchez contrasted the effort with the denazification of Germany after WWII, where the American military had clear responsibility for policy, planning and implementation. To ensure success, specific goals were set and an effective process was put into place to reach those goals...in this case, the CPA treated the entire endeavor as if they were issuing an academic, theoretical paper."<ref name=Sanchez>{{citation | Sanchez contrasted the effort with the denazification of Germany after WWII, where the American military had clear responsibility for policy, planning and implementation. To ensure success, specific goals were set and an effective process was put into place to reach those goals...in this case, the CPA treated the entire endeavor as if they were issuing an academic, theoretical paper."<ref name=Sanchez>{{citation | ||
Line 64: | Line 63: | ||
pp. 183-187</ref> | pp. 183-187</ref> | ||
In the Arabic documents from the CPA, the word used for | In the Arabic documents from the CPA, the word used for de-Ba'athification was ''ijtithaath''. Literally, that means "uproot by root and branch", but the connotation was closer to "annihilation or eradication". According to John Maguire of the Central Intelligence Agency station, it reminded Iraqis of the Final Solution. When he told Bremer it was a "heinous word...he blew it off." Maguire said the CIA station was cut out of CPA planning. <ref name=Hubris>{{citation | ||
| title = Hubris: the Inside Story of Spin, Scandal and the Selling of the Iraq War | | title = Hubris: the Inside Story of Spin, Scandal and the Selling of the Iraq War | ||
| last1 = Isakoff | first1= Michael | first2 = David | last2 = Corn | | last1 = Isakoff | first1= Michael | first2 = David | last2 = Corn | ||
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==References== | ==References== | ||
{{reflist|2}} | {{reflist|2}}[[Category:Suggestion Bot Tag]] |
Latest revision as of 11:00, 5 August 2024
This article may be deleted soon. | ||
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After Saddam Hussein took control of Iraq in 1980, the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party, Baa'th in common use, because the only political party; removing the problems of Saddam's regime also meant extirpating the leadership of the party, in the process of de-Ba'athification. The term is drawn from the denazification in the occupation of Nazi Germany after WWII. De-Ba'athification was clearly US policy, but, as with Nazi Germany, it was also recognized that some party members were nonpolitical but had to be members to hold jobs in the nation's infrastructure. There were, however, disconnects between the policy and implementation of de-Ba'athification, and some of the implementation may have contributed to delays in restoring Iraqi infrastructure. PreparationWhen L. Paul Bremer|L. Paul "Jerry" Bremer prepared to leave for Iraq, on May 9, 2003, Donald Rumsfeld had given him a general directive, "The coalition will actively oppose Saddam Hussein's old enforcers — the Ba'ath Party, the Saddam Fedayeen, etc. We will make it clear that the Coalition will eliminate the remnants of Saddam's regime." According to Bremer, Under Secretary for Policy Douglas Feith showed him a more sweeping order, and suggested Bremer issue the order that day. Bremer responded "Hold on a minute, I agree it's a very important step, so important it should wait 'til I get there." Feith emphasized Rumsfeld's directive that it was to be carried out "even if implementing it caused administrative inconvenience." Bremer saw this as potentially more than inconvenience. [1] Within the Iraqi political groups, there was no common belief. The INC and Shi'a parties, backed by civilians in the U.S. Department of Defense, wanted the most stringent policy. The Iraqi National Accord and liberals affiliated with Adnan al-Pachaci accepted the most narrow definition. Jay Garner's ORHA did not address it. It was hard to tell what the Kurdish groups wanted, but Bremer, who had the power, was emphatic on a strict process. [2] Unfortunately, Bremer did not pay attention to the design of the government under Saddam being organized around the party, and structural changes were needed to establish executive groups if there was strong de-Ba'athification. [3] Party outlawedOn April 16, 2003, GEN Tommy Franks announced the end of combat. [4] He recommended that only the senior Ba'ath Party leadership be blacklisted, on the assumption, much as with the Soviet Communist Party, that Party members ran most of the basic government services. Nevertheless, the Party was dissolved on May 12, and CENTCOM was faced with the job of creating a new civilian infrastructure. Initial policyLTG (ret) Jay Garner said that he had protested full de-Ba'athification to Bremer, who said "These are the directions I have. I have directions to execute this...""[5] Garner had experience running humanitarian operations in Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War. Garner said that he always considered himself in a temporary role. He said that Franks had been promised a large number of constabulary from other nations; his immediate goal, before de-Ba'athification, was "...setting up to pay the civil servants and the police and the pensioners. ORHA, however, never really was operational. It was caught, in part, in bureaucratic fighting principally between State and Defense, with some separate positions from Cheney and Rice. EffectsCPA Order Number 1 set up de-Ba'athification. It banned the four “Senior Party Member” top Party ranks, removing them from office and banning them from future public employment, regardless of their role in government or their criminal activities: [6]
are hereby removed from their positions and banned from future employment in the public sector. Further, those of any rank, who held the top three positions in "every national government ministry, affiliated corporations, and other government institutions (e.g., universities and hospitals)." This affected 400,000 military workers and 100,000 civilians. The key problem was in the second category, who might well have had no role in party leadership. Linda Robinson, a journalist and author of Tell me how this ends: General Petraeus and the search for a way out of Iraq, was invited to discuss the general situation with the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. She began saying that the insurgency was caused by the early decisions of the US Coalition Provisional Authority for de-Ba'athification and disbanding of the Iraqi military.[7] Sanchez agreed that the top leadership levels needed to be removed and "those with blood on their hands held accountable and prosecuted. It was the unilateral firing of almost everyone else that created the real problem." Originally, only Bremer himself had the authority to grant exceptions, but, nine days later, he created an Iraqi De-Ba'athification Council reporting directly to him. There were no local-level committees to deal with the "top three positions" in what well might be local organizations. Further, the Committee was led by Ahmed Chalabi's nephew, whose uncle wanted a total purge of Ba'athists. Sanchez told his commanders to continue with locals in office, "Figure out a best you can what functions we need to establish. Get the best people available and let's get these functions back up and running. And for God's sake, keep the schools open and let the kids finished the school year." Sanchez contrasted the effort with the denazification of Germany after WWII, where the American military had clear responsibility for policy, planning and implementation. To ensure success, specific goals were set and an effective process was put into place to reach those goals...in this case, the CPA treated the entire endeavor as if they were issuing an academic, theoretical paper."[8] In the Arabic documents from the CPA, the word used for de-Ba'athification was ijtithaath. Literally, that means "uproot by root and branch", but the connotation was closer to "annihilation or eradication". According to John Maguire of the Central Intelligence Agency station, it reminded Iraqis of the Final Solution. When he told Bremer it was a "heinous word...he blew it off." Maguire said the CIA station was cut out of CPA planning. [9] References
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