Hashed message authentication code: Difference between revisions
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If HMAC verification succeeds, the receiver knows not only that the message is unchanged since the hash was generated (which he would know with any hash algorithm), but also that whoever generated the HMAC knew the appropriate key. This prevents an attacker without the key from altering a message and generating a valid hash for the changed version. HMACs prevent [[man-in-the-middle attack]]s. | If HMAC verification succeeds, the receiver knows not only that the message is unchanged since the hash was generated (which he would know with any hash algorithm), but also that whoever generated the HMAC knew the appropriate key. This prevents an attacker without the key from altering a message and generating a valid hash for the changed version. HMACs prevent [[man-in-the-middle attack]]s. | ||
[[IPsec]] uses an HMAC for packet-level authentication. | [[IPsec]] uses an HMAC for packet-level authentication. RFC 2104 <ref>{{cite | ||
| author = H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare and R. Canetti | |||
| title = HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication | |||
| date = November 1997 | |||
| url = http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2104 | |||
}}</ref> gives a general definition of the HMAC technique for this usage. More detail is in RFC 2202, RFC 2403, RFC 2404, RFC 2085, RFC 2857, RFC 4635, RFC 4650. | |||
Many applications use both a [[block cipher]] for secrecy and an HMAC for data authentication, Such a system must make two passes through the data, one to encrypt it and one to hash it. There is recent work on the design of algorithms that can do both in one pass. Many of the proposed solutions take the form of new [[Block_cipher_modes_of_operation#Dual_use_modes|modes of operation]] for block ciphers. | Many applications use both a [[block cipher]] for secrecy and an HMAC for data authentication, Such a system must make two passes through the data, one to encrypt it and one to hash it. There is recent work on the design of algorithms that can do both in one pass. Many of the proposed solutions take the form of new [[Block_cipher_modes_of_operation#Dual_use_modes|modes of operation]] for block ciphers. | ||
== References == | |||
{{reflist|2}} | |||
Revision as of 21:06, 3 December 2008
A hashed message authentication code or HMAC is a cryptographic technique for providing data integrity protection.
HMACs use a cryptographic hash algorithm and a cryptographic key. The sender generates the HMAC from the message and the key; the receiver verifies using both.
If HMAC verification succeeds, the receiver knows not only that the message is unchanged since the hash was generated (which he would know with any hash algorithm), but also that whoever generated the HMAC knew the appropriate key. This prevents an attacker without the key from altering a message and generating a valid hash for the changed version. HMACs prevent man-in-the-middle attacks.
IPsec uses an HMAC for packet-level authentication. RFC 2104 [1] gives a general definition of the HMAC technique for this usage. More detail is in RFC 2202, RFC 2403, RFC 2404, RFC 2085, RFC 2857, RFC 4635, RFC 4650.
Many applications use both a block cipher for secrecy and an HMAC for data authentication, Such a system must make two passes through the data, one to encrypt it and one to hash it. There is recent work on the design of algorithms that can do both in one pass. Many of the proposed solutions take the form of new modes of operation for block ciphers.
References
- ↑ H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare and R. Canetti. HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication. [[{{{publisher}}}]], copyright November 1997.