The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy

An outgrowth of an essay originally published in the London Review of Books by academics John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy is one of the most provocative and controversial foreign policy books of recent times. The authors' basic premise is that the United States' level of commitment to the State of Israel cannot be justified either on strategic or moral terms, and is damaging both to American interests and Israel's long-term security. Their work developed over several years, after they were commissioned to write a feature by the Atlantic Monthly.

The nature of the lobby

They regard the Israel Lobby as not a rigidly structured organization, but a collection of individuals and interest groups, both in the US and Israel. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee is the most politically influential group in the US, but it is not alone. "A lobbyist for AIPAC [is] part of the core...while a individuals who occasionally write letters supporting Israel to their local newspaper or send checks to a pro-Israel political action committee should be seen as part of the broader network...this definition does not mean that every American with favorable attitudes toward Israel is a member of the lobby. To offer a personal illustration, the authors of this book are 'pro-Israel', in that we support its right to exist, admire its many achievements...and believe the United States should come to Israel's aid if its survival is in danger."

"We use 'Israel lobby as a convenient shorthand term for the loose coalition of individuals and organizations that actively work to shape US foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction. Some organization, such as the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA), and especially the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), are clearly part of it. Even among those groups, there are variations, such as individuals, such as Morton Klein of ZOA and John Hagee of Christians United For Israel, who oppose a two-state solution, versus two-state supporters such as Dennis Ross of Washington Institute for a Near East Policy or Martin Indyk of the Brookings Institution.

As a result of the Six Days' War, the lobby grew stronger, but the situation became more conflicted as the military situation moved to attrition, and then the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.

They say the majority of groups in the lobby favor steadfast support, but differ on the peace process and on conditions for aid. AIPAC is "opposed to linking Israel's aid under any circumstances because once it starts, it never stops." Americans for Peace Now wants only to restrict aid for being used to support settlements in the Occupied Territories. Israel Policy Forum speaks less of conditional aid and more on increasing the effectiveness of U.S. diplomacy. Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP) is the main group that has called for suspension fof military aid until Israel leaves the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem; "given this position, one might argue that JVP is not part of the lobby at all."

It is by no means a Jewish phenomenon; Christian Zionism is an influential movement in the United States, and there are Jews both in Israel and the US that do not see the current bilateral relationship as ideal. There are other aspects throughout the Middle East, especially with respect to Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Syria and Palestine.

Criticism

Leslie Gelb, who had previously regarded the authors as serious scholars, was surprised "by their puzzlingly shoddy scholarship, by what they emphasize and de-emphasize, by what they leave out and by writing on this sensitive topic without doing extensive interviews with the lobbyists and the lobbied." He agrees the aid package to Israel is politically untouchable, but points out that the comparable package to Egypt also is sacrosanct, and regarded by many as a cheap safeguard against a war between the two. Gelb also points out that the American government has chastised Israel in private, and that there are two major ares, "arms sales to Arab states and the question of a Palestinian state" where US policy differs from that of the "all-powerful lobby".

Strategic relationship

The level of US support for Israel could be justified if if filled a key strategic role. During the Cold War, there was a fairly strong case, but less so at other times.

Period of independence

In 1948, Israel was seen as too weak to be an effective ally; while Harry S. Truman and many American Jews felt a moral obligation, George Marshall and George Kennan saw political Zionism as a liability to relations with the Arab world.

Judith Apter Klinghoffer gives a different version of the meeting involving Marshall and Kennan. Drawing from Clark Clifford's Counsel to the President, Marshall did not believe the Israelis could defend themselves. Marshall said that if the "Jews got into trouble and 'came running to us for help . . . .They were clearly on notice that there was no warrant to expect help from the United States" (Clifford, p.10). He thought the Jews were wrong to believe they can handle the Arabs by themselves.

Soviet expansion

By the early 1960s, however, Soviet aid to Arab nations was sufficient that John F. Kennedy saw a reason to balance it. Israel's performance in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War put a new light on the situation: Israel was seen as a proxy against Soviet expansion, and was a source of intelligence on Soviet capabilities. While the authors call this "factually correct", they suggest it was not as clear as was thought:

1. American support pushed Arab states toward the Soviets
2. Israel's military dominance, and Arab resentment, did not contribute to a solution to the Arab-Israeli problem
3. Arab recognition of US support engendered anti-Americanism.
4. The Arab oil embargo was a direct response to Nixon's major support in 1973, and the relationship hurt US access to Persian Gulf oil; Israel could not deter a direct Soviet attack on oilfield

After the fall of the Soviet Union, however, there was no need for an anti-Soviet asset.

Post-9/11

al-Qaeda and the Palestinians

They indicate that Lobby members, after 9/11 insist that Osama bin Laden only recently linked his cause to that of Palestinians. They quote Dennis Ross as suggesting that bin Laden was, in their words, "trying to gain legitimacy by implying his attack was about the plight of the Palestinians". The authors are correct that Ross quoted bin Laden, after 9/11, as saying "America will not live in peace before peace reigns in Palestine" . Further, Ross wrote that Arafat "cannot afford for Osama bin Laden to become the champion of the Palestinian movement. The consequences for him internationally and domestically would be devastating. ... He understands that. ...In the past, when Arafat moved against Hamas and Islamic Jihad, it was not because of what they did to Israel, but because of what he feared they might do to him. That is the reason he is cracking down seriously on the pro-bin Laden demonstrations now."

This is not as simple as either side claims. Part of the reason for targeting the United States, which started in the 1990s, was psychological. In February 1998, bin Laden, along with al-Zawahiri of Egyptian Islamic Jihad and leaders of the Egyptian Islamic Group, Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan, and the Jihad Movement of Bangladesh, issued a fatwa calling for jihad against "Crusaders and Jews", and, specifically, Americans. The primary reason given is to evict "Crusaders and Jews" from the Muslim holy lands,

The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and military -- is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim.

In that sense, Ross was correct that the attack was not principally about the Palestinians. It also, however, mentioned "the aim is also to serve the Jews' petty state and divert attention from its occupation of Jerusalem and murder of Muslims there." In context, those Muslims are clearly Palestinians.

Iraq War

The Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America, which the book calls part of the lobby, argues that while the book suggests the Iraq War was waged to increase Israeli security, he had said, in a 2004 interview, that he believed US decisionmakers went to war with Iraq primarily because they expected to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In the book, it is mentioned that Israel was the source of some of the intelligence leading US policymakers to believe Iraq was a WMD threat. Further, GEN Wesley Clark was quoted that the fear was that Iraq might use a nuclear weapon against Israel. Ruth Wedwood, an academic and member of the Defense Policy Board, said Iraq was an existential threat against Israel; she did not mention such a threat against the US.

Moral imperatives

"While there is no question that Jews were frequently victims in Europe, in the past century they have often been the victimizers in the Middle East, and their main victims were and continue to be Palestinians."