User:Nick Gardner /Sandbox: Difference between revisions
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Social capital is believed to come into being by the process termed [[Emergence (biology)|emergence]] by which a [[complex interactive system]]<ref> defined at [http://en.citizendium.org/wiki/Complex_interactive_system/Definition]</ref> can transform itself from chaos to order. The initial position is taken to be similar to the "state of nature" envisaged by [[Thomas Hobbes]] in which there is a constant "war of all against all". | Social capital is believed to come into being by the process termed [[Emergence (biology)|emergence]] by which a [[complex interactive system]]<ref> defined at [http://en.citizendium.org/wiki/Complex_interactive_system/Definition]</ref> can transform itself from chaos to order. The initial position is taken to be similar to the "state of nature" envisaged by [[Thomas Hobbes]] in which there is a constant "war of all against all". That condition is taken to be analagous to the [[prisoner's dilemma]] parable <ref> defined at [http://en.citizendium.org/wiki/Prisoner%27s_dilemma/Definition]</ref> in which both participants suffer unnecessarily because neither trusts the other. It is known, however, that if the two protagonists expect to interact repeatedly they can arrive by trial and error at a mutually beneficial [[evolutionary stable strategy]], and that once such a strategy is established, it is likely to persist. | ||
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Revision as of 17:01, 26 December 2009
Social capital is believed to come into being by the process termed emergence by which a complex interactive system[1] can transform itself from chaos to order. The initial position is taken to be similar to the "state of nature" envisaged by Thomas Hobbes in which there is a constant "war of all against all". That condition is taken to be analagous to the prisoner's dilemma parable [2] in which both participants suffer unnecessarily because neither trusts the other. It is known, however, that if the two protagonists expect to interact repeatedly they can arrive by trial and error at a mutually beneficial evolutionary stable strategy, and that once such a strategy is established, it is likely to persist.