Competition policy

The purpose of competition policy is to regulate those business practices that restrict competition, and to limit the ability of firms to combine in such a way as to enable them to restrict competition.

Although there had been legislation about competition in Elizabethan England, modern competition policy had its origin in United States antitrust legislation of the late nineteenth century . Its introduction outside the United States began in Europe after the second world war, and it has since spread to most developed countries. Its early development was generally influenced by early antitrust practice, but subsequent intellectual and legal developments have brought about significant modifications.

There are uncertainties about the likely impact of competition policy upon the practice of business that arise from the fact that its operation requires the exercise of a considerable degree of expert judgement. Its legislative framework provides no more than a broad indication of the intentions of the policy makers who devised it, and it delegates to the authorities which it appoints, a wide range of discretion in their performance of the task of giving practical effect to those intentions. Also, its rationale is in some respects incomplete, leaving scope for a range of interpretations.

This article is concerned only with underlying principles and common practices. There are separate articles about the operation of EU competition policy and about the operation of Antitrust policy in the United States.

Rationale

It is generally accepted that the purpose of competition policy is to improve economic welfare (although it can be argued that the founders of United States antitrust law were mainly motivated by a wish to limit the power of big business ). Its basis is a set of propositions that were put forward by economists in the nineteenth century. Those propositions are founded, however, on a highly simplified model of the economy, and even within that model, they are subject to important qualifications. (As is noted in the article on competition such qualifications arise from the existence of externalities and from the theory of the second best). However, subject to an occasional need to allow for those qualifications, there is a strong presumption that a reduction in barriers to competition will result in an improvement in the form of economic efficiency that is known to economists as allocative efficiency. Competition policy is not usually concerned only with the promotion of competition, however. In the pursuit of economic welfare, account may also to be taken of its effects upon productive efficiency.

Thus competition theory provides the intellectual foundation for competition policy but it does not provide all that is needed to build a serviceable structure upon that foundation. It does not lead to unequivocal prescriptions except where competition is the only question at issue - and even then the questions of externalities and of ‘the second-best’ may introduce qualifications. Where the issue of gains in productive efficiency also arises, other branches of economic theory must be called in aid. The difficulties which then arise stem not so much from the limitations of the available theory, as from the fact that quantification is then needed in order to draw up a balance between losses of allocative efficiency and gains of productive efficiency. The information requirements for that purpose tend to be demanding, and commercial accounting systems are seldom capable of providing the necessary inputs. In practical terms, therefore, the economic rationale for competition policy is incomplete and its implementation depends partly upon judgement rather than entirely upon analysis.

Regulatory practices

Definition by form or by effect

The first requirement of a regulatory system is a definition of the practices which fall within its scope. A practice may be defined for that purpose either in terms of its form, or in terms of its effect. An example of the application of a form-based or per se definition would be the prohibition of exclusive dealing (the practice of making it a condition of supply that a retailer does not deal with other suppliers). A form-based definition of that sort has the merit of letting all concerned know exactly where they stand. It also simplifies regulation by excluding all considerations other than the evidence concerning the existence of the practice. However, it invites the use of devices which meet the letter of the law but evade its intent. A loyalty rebate could, in the example, be used to obtain the equivalent of exclusive dealing without breaching the form-based prohibition of that practice. An attempt to amend the form-based rules to prevent companies from evading the intent of the policy may result in an unending contest between the drafters of legislation and the company lawyers. A prohibition of practices which have the effect of exclusive dealing could not be evaded in that way, and that alternative has the merit of directly attacking the real problem. On the other hand, the use of an effects-based prohibition introduces an element of judgement into the implementation of policy, which may reduce its certainty. The circumstances under which a quantity discount would be deemed to have the prohibited effect might, in the example, be unclear. In the longer term, however, many such uncertainties might be expected to be resolved by the establishment of precedents.

Structure and behaviour

In principle, there is a choice between using the regulation of industry structure to prevent the acquisition of market power, or using the regulation of business conduct to prevent its abuse. The effectiveness of conduct regulation is, however, limited by the need for a detailed understanding of the circumstances of each case. The regulation of industry structure may thus appear preferable, but other factors such as the advantages of large-scale operation may count against it. Regulatory systems that are concerned exclusively with the promotion of competition are likely to implement that objective mainly by stringent control upon mergers and by the breaking up of existing monopolies. Where more weight is given to the promotion of productive efficiency, account is likely to be taken of the benefits of mergers and of the costs of disruption. The more permissive attitude toward mergers which such objectives imply may require a correspondingly severe attitude toward the abuse of market power.