Battle of Dien Bien Phu: Difference between revisions
imported>Hayford Peirce (removed Navarre typo -- formatting is still weird until I do a Preview. Must have something to do with your text -- are you using Notepad, maybe?) |
imported>Howard C. Berkowitz |
||
| Line 17: | Line 17: | ||
*[[Christian de Castries]] | *[[Christian de Castries]] | ||
==Previous military use== | ==Previous military use== | ||
In 1952, Giap had recognized the French were weak in Laos, and sent three divisions and an independent regiment southwest from his mountainous bases. They pushed the French back, clearing road junctions and capturing small towns including Muong Thon, also known as Dien Bien Phu. | |||
He was able to lay siege to the capital of the capital at Luang Prabang, but, learning caution, decided not to press the attack into the rainy season. In November, French paratroopers recaptured the town, although this was not part of the main fortification. Both sides decided to reinforce for the battle that would begin in March. <ref name=Mallin>{{citation | |||
| title = General Vo Nguyen Giap, North Vietnamese Military Commander | |||
| first = Jay | last = Maillin | |||
| publisher = Samhar Press | year = 1973 }}, p. 12-15}}</ref> | |||
===Communist planning=== | |||
After Giap had drawn the French strength toward Dien Bien Phu, he used backbreaking human work to bring howitzers and anti-aircraft artillery into the hills surrounding the French base. He used his laborers to dig the weapons into impregnable positions: a cannon could fire and be quickly pulled back into the safety of a cage. | |||
He had had orders from the North Vietnamese Polituro to launch human-wave attacks on January 26, which he concluded would play into the French strength. Instead, possibly endangering his life, he called off the order, and continued fortification and besieging until March 13.<ref>Moore & Galloway, pp. 45-46}}</ref> | |||
==Establishing the base== | ==Establishing the base== | ||
Revision as of 00:19, 25 November 2008
Template:TOC-right Dien Bien Phu is a valley and small town in North Vietnam, 260 miles northwest of Hanoi and the place of the 1954 decisive battle that soon forced France to relinquish control of colonial Indochina. In military discussions, Dien Bien Phu has also become a synonym for an extremely unwise decision: the attempt to hold a seemingly strong defensive position, against which the enemy, cooperating with the defender's plans, will then destroy himself against the impregnable fortifications. Unfortunately, the Viet Minh, commanded by Vo Nguyen Giap, did not play the part the French commander, Henri Navarre, had written for them.
The place
That the correct Vietnamese name for the area is not even Dien Bien Phu characterizes the misunderstandings that went into the battle. Properly, the area centers on a village called Muong Thanh by the T'ai tribesmen of the area. [1]
The opponents
Previous military use
In 1952, Giap had recognized the French were weak in Laos, and sent three divisions and an independent regiment southwest from his mountainous bases. They pushed the French back, clearing road junctions and capturing small towns including Muong Thon, also known as Dien Bien Phu.
He was able to lay siege to the capital of the capital at Luang Prabang, but, learning caution, decided not to press the attack into the rainy season. In November, French paratroopers recaptured the town, although this was not part of the main fortification. Both sides decided to reinforce for the battle that would begin in March. [2]
Communist planning
After Giap had drawn the French strength toward Dien Bien Phu, he used backbreaking human work to bring howitzers and anti-aircraft artillery into the hills surrounding the French base. He used his laborers to dig the weapons into impregnable positions: a cannon could fire and be quickly pulled back into the safety of a cage.
He had had orders from the North Vietnamese Polituro to launch human-wave attacks on January 26, which he concluded would play into the French strength. Instead, possibly endangering his life, he called off the order, and continued fortification and besieging until March 13.[3]
Establishing the base
"Mission creep" was among the many French military sins. Originally, Navarre had planned to block Viet Minh access to Laos, and interfere with Giap's supply lines and his drug trade. As the Geneva conference of 1954 approached, however, he felt under pressure to produce a decisive victory.[4]
Party concept
Giap's reinterpretation of orders
The Battle
Aftermath
Lessons learned
When North Vietnamese and American troops faced one another at another remote valley, both sides had Dien Bien Phu in mind at the Battle of Khe Sanh.
References
- ↑ Bernard B., Fall (1967), Hell in a Very Small Place: the Siege of Dien Bien Phu, J. B. Lippincott, pp. 23-24
- ↑ Maillin, Jay (1973), General Vo Nguyen Giap, North Vietnamese Military Commander, Samhar Press, p. 12-15}}
- ↑ Moore & Galloway, pp. 45-46}}
- ↑ Moore, Harold G. (Hal) & Joseph L. Galloway (2008), We are soldiers still: a journey back to the battlefields of Vietnam, Harper Collins, p. 129