Manchurian Incident: Difference between revisions
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A major milestone on the march to [[World War Two in the Pacific]], the '''Manchurian Incident''' of 18-19 September 1931 expanded from the [[Mukden Incident]] into the beginnings of fighting between Japan and China. | |||
<ref>{{citation | |||
| url = http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/IMTFE/IMTFE-5.html | |||
| publisher = [[International Military Tribunal for the Far East]] | |||
| title = Chapter V, Japanese Aggression Against China. Section I. Invasion & Occupation of Manchuria. The China War and Its Phases | |||
}}, pp. 544-564</ref> | |||
It was planned by Lieutenant Colonel [[Kanji Ishihara]] and Colonel [[Seishiro Itagaki]], who were on the staff of the [[Kwangtung Army]]. Ishiwara, the theoretician, subscribed to a "Final World War Theory" that would determine if Japan or the United States would dominate the world. "In January 1928, at a meeting of the Mokuyo-kai (Thursday Society) group of elite officers who graduated from the Imperial Japanese Army's War College, Ishihara said, 'The nation could stand being in a state of war for even 20 years or 30 years if we have footholds all over China and fully use them.'" <ref name=YS>{{citation | |||
| url = http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/features/0007/01.htm | |||
| publisher = Yomiuri Shimbun | |||
| title = War Responsibility--delving into the past (1) / Who should bear the most blame for the Showa War?}}</ref> | |||
==Background== | |||
Japan controlled the [[Kwangtung Leasehold]], an area in [[Manchuria]], containing [[Port Arthur]] and [[Darien]]. The South Manchurian Railroad Line, owned by a Japanese corporation, terminated in the Leasehold; the railroad provided cover for Japanese intelligence and covert action throughout Manchuria.<ref name=DB1091>{{citation | |||
| title= Japan's Imperial Conspiracy | |||
| author = David Bergamini | |||
| date = 1971 | publisher = Morrow}}, p. 1091</ref> | |||
==The action== | |||
On the night of 18 September 1931, officers from the [[Kwangtung Army]] triggered an explosion along the South Manchurian Railway Line, at Liu'tiaokou, north of Mukden, Manchuria. There was no actual damage to the Japanese-controlled tracks, but Col. Seishiro commanded the 29th Infantry Regiment and Independent Garrison Force to attack the baracks, in Mukden, of the Chinese Manchurian Army. Ishihara then gave a false report to overall Kwangtung Army commander [[Shigeru Hongo]] | |||
Using plans previously written by Ishiwara, Hongo ordered Japanese troops to move beyond the borders of the leased Japanese territory, and take control of towns along the railroad. They then began a campaign to seize major cities of Manchuria. Reports first reached the Palace from newspapers, in which the Kwangtung Army blamed the Chinese. [[Takeji Nara]], Chief Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor, told Hirohito that he did not think the incident would spread, but that the Emperor should hold a conference to review the situation and take control. Other Imperial advisers, [[Nobuaki Makino]] and [[Kinmochi Saionji]], overruled Nara, arguing that any failure of decisions made at such a meeting would "soil...the virtue of his majesty."<ref name=Bix422>{{citation | |||
| title = Hirohito and the making of modern Japan | |||
| author = Herbert P. Bix | |||
| publisher = Harper Perennial | |||
| year = 2001 | isbn = 978-0060931308 | |||
}}, pp. 235-236</ref> | |||
==References== | |||
{{reflist|2}} | |||
Revision as of 14:45, 27 August 2010
A major milestone on the march to World War Two in the Pacific, the Manchurian Incident of 18-19 September 1931 expanded from the Mukden Incident into the beginnings of fighting between Japan and China. [1]
It was planned by Lieutenant Colonel Kanji Ishihara and Colonel Seishiro Itagaki, who were on the staff of the Kwangtung Army. Ishiwara, the theoretician, subscribed to a "Final World War Theory" that would determine if Japan or the United States would dominate the world. "In January 1928, at a meeting of the Mokuyo-kai (Thursday Society) group of elite officers who graduated from the Imperial Japanese Army's War College, Ishihara said, 'The nation could stand being in a state of war for even 20 years or 30 years if we have footholds all over China and fully use them.'" [2]
Background
Japan controlled the Kwangtung Leasehold, an area in Manchuria, containing Port Arthur and Darien. The South Manchurian Railroad Line, owned by a Japanese corporation, terminated in the Leasehold; the railroad provided cover for Japanese intelligence and covert action throughout Manchuria.[3]
The action
On the night of 18 September 1931, officers from the Kwangtung Army triggered an explosion along the South Manchurian Railway Line, at Liu'tiaokou, north of Mukden, Manchuria. There was no actual damage to the Japanese-controlled tracks, but Col. Seishiro commanded the 29th Infantry Regiment and Independent Garrison Force to attack the baracks, in Mukden, of the Chinese Manchurian Army. Ishihara then gave a false report to overall Kwangtung Army commander Shigeru Hongo
Using plans previously written by Ishiwara, Hongo ordered Japanese troops to move beyond the borders of the leased Japanese territory, and take control of towns along the railroad. They then began a campaign to seize major cities of Manchuria. Reports first reached the Palace from newspapers, in which the Kwangtung Army blamed the Chinese. Takeji Nara, Chief Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor, told Hirohito that he did not think the incident would spread, but that the Emperor should hold a conference to review the situation and take control. Other Imperial advisers, Nobuaki Makino and Kinmochi Saionji, overruled Nara, arguing that any failure of decisions made at such a meeting would "soil...the virtue of his majesty."[4]
References
- ↑ Chapter V, Japanese Aggression Against China. Section I. Invasion & Occupation of Manchuria. The China War and Its Phases, International Military Tribunal for the Far East, pp. 544-564
- ↑ War Responsibility--delving into the past (1) / Who should bear the most blame for the Showa War?, Yomiuri Shimbun
- ↑ David Bergamini (1971), Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, Morrow, p. 1091
- ↑ Herbert P. Bix (2001), Hirohito and the making of modern Japan, Harper Perennial, ISBN 978-0060931308, pp. 235-236