< CZ:Featured articleRevision as of 09:28, 9 March 2014 by imported>Ro Thorpe
Moral responsibility is an assignment of a duty or obligation to behave in a 'good' manner and refrain from behaving in a 'bad' manner. From a philosophical standpoint, the rationale behind 'good' and 'bad' is a subject for ethics[1] and metaethics.[2]
Stent provides four conditions for assigning moral responsibility, among them the "duties and obligations devolving from moral, legal, or ritual imperatives".[3] In everyday life, obligation in this context is distinguished in part from milder demands for conformity like etiquette by the intense and insistent social pressure brought to bear upon those who deviate or threaten to deviate.[4] From an anthropological or sociological standpoint, the specifics of what is 'good' or 'bad', and the ways of enforcing acceptable behavior, vary considerably from one group to another.[5]
- "Social learning theorists...feel that the learning of moral rules is not culturally invariant, but is, rather, critically related to particular learning environments and to the distinctive normative code of the society in question. The major influences on moral development are what B.F. Skinner calls "contingencies of reinforcement"...culturally variable factors that explain why different peoples acquire different types of moral orientations."
'Moral responsibility' is part of the interplay between the individual and their society, and study of this relationship is both a scientific and a philosophical investigation.[6][7]
- "The study of ethics is concerned not only with identification of societal values but with thinking logically about ethical challenges and developing practical approaches to moral problem solving. Other disciplines also are concerned with discovering society's moral precepts. For example, sociology and anthropology each study cultural norms."[8]
A large part of the philosophical discussion of 'moral responsibility' is focused upon the logical implications (as distinct from the ascertainable facts, such as they may be) of whether or not humans actually are able to control their actions to some or another extent.[9][10] Resolution of that issue is the philosophical subject of free will, a continuing debate that began millennia ago and seems destined to continue indefinitely. It is known that humans' control over their actions is limited in some circumstances, and there is debate over the role of moral responsibility where there is only curtailed agency.
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- ↑
David Shoemaker (Feb 13, 2012). Edward N. Zalta, ed:Personal Identity and Ethics. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition).
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Geoff Sayre-McCord (Jan 26, 2012). Edward N. Zalta, ed:Metaethics. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2012 Edition).
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Gunther Siegmund Stent (2002). Paradoxes of free will. American Philosophical Society, p. 97. ISBN 0871699265.
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HLA Hart (2012). The Concept of Law, 3rd. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0199644705. Reprint of 1961 edition with introduction by Leslie Greene.
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Richard W. Wilson (1981). “Moral rules”, A. Kleinman, T.Y. Lin, eds: Normal and Abnormal Behavior in Chinese Culture. Springer, pp. 119-120. ISBN 9027711046.
The reference is to BF Skinner (2002). Beyond Freedom and Dignity, Reprint of Knopf 1971 ed. Hackett Publishing, p. 128. ISBN 1603844163.
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Howard H. Kendler (2008). “Nature's search for human values”, Amoral thoughts about morality, 2nd ed. Charles C Thomas, pp. 27 ff. ISBN 0398077924.
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John Henry Morgan (2005). Naturally Good: A Behavioral History of Moral Development from Charles Darwin to E.O. Wilson. Cloverdale Press. ISBN 1929569130.
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Donald Carper, John McKinsey, Bill West (2007). “The nature of ethical inquiry”, Understanding the law, 5th ed. Cengage Learning, p. 28. ISBN 111179801X.
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Manuel Vargas (2013). Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press, p. 10. ISBN 0191655775. “[There are] other legitimate worries one can have about responsibility. For example, one could be worried about the consequences of reductionism of the mental (including whether our minds do anything, or whether they are epiphenomenal byproducts of more basic causal processes). Alternately, one might be worried that specific results in some or another science (usually, neurology but sometimes psychology) show that we lack some crucial power necessary for moral responsibility....”
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Peter Cane (2002). Responsibility in Law and Morality. Hart Publishing, p. 4. ISBN 1841133213. “A common argument in the philosophical literature is that the essence of responsibility is to be found in what it means to be a human agent and to have free will...There is disagreement amongst philosophers about what freedom means, about whether human beings are free in the relevant sense, and about the relevance of freedom to responsibility...Nevertheless, both in law and "morality" we regularly hold people responsible, and treat people in certain ways on the basis of our judgments of responsibility."”
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