Pacification in South Vietnam: Difference between revisions

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{{seealso|Foreign internal defense}}
{{seealso|Foreign internal defense}}
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{{TOC-right}}
[[Lyndon Johnson]] and [[Robert MacNamara]], in selecting a strategy in 1965, had assumed the enemy forces were assumed that much as the defeat of the Axis military had won the [[Second World War]], the Communist military was the [[Centers of gravity (military)|center of gravity]] of the opposition, rather than the political opposition. [[William Westmoreland]], and to a lesser extent [[Maxwell Taylor]],  rejected, if they seriously considered, the protracted war doctrine stated by Mao and restated <ref name=MaoProtracted>{{citation
[[Lyndon Johnson]] and [[Robert McNamara]], in selecting a strategy in 1965, had assumed the enemy forces were assumed that much as the defeat of the Axis military had won the [[Second World War]], the Communist military was the [[Centers of gravity (military)|center of gravity]] of the opposition, rather than the political opposition. [[William Westmoreland]], and to a lesser extent [[Maxwell Taylor]],  rejected, if they seriously considered, the protracted war doctrine stated by Mao and restated <ref name=MaoProtracted>{{citation
  | url = http://www.marx2mao.com/Mao/PW38.html
  | url = http://www.marx2mao.com/Mao/PW38.html
  | author = Mao Tse-tung
  | author = Mao Tse-tung

Revision as of 01:17, 13 November 2008

See also: Foreign internal defense

Template:TOC-right Lyndon Johnson and Robert McNamara, in selecting a strategy in 1965, had assumed the enemy forces were assumed that much as the defeat of the Axis military had won the Second World War, the Communist military was the center of gravity of the opposition, rather than the political opposition. William Westmoreland, and to a lesser extent Maxwell Taylor, rejected, if they seriously considered, the protracted war doctrine stated by Mao and restated [1] by the DRV leadership, mirror-imaging that they would be reasonable by American standards, and see that they could not prevail against steady escalation. They proposed to defeat an enemy, through attrition of his forces, who guided by the Maoist doctrine of Protracted War, which itself assumed it would attrit the counterinsurgents.

An alternative view, considering overall security as critical, was shared by the Marine leadership and some other U.S. government centers of opinion, including Central Intelligence Agency, Agency for International Development, and United States Army Special Forces.

Marine approach to stabilization

The Marines, with responsibility for "I Corps," the northern third of the country, had a plan for Phase I. It reflected their historic experience in pacification programs in Haiti and Nicaragua early in the century. [2]

Marine thinking also reflected the limited capabilities of the units first deployed to Vietnam, principally for airbase defense. They recognized that fighting the guerillas they could reach would not have a major effect. If there was to be a solution, it was "to win the support of the people, and thereby deny that support to the VC." This civil affairs-driven philosophy also assumed that the people needed to support their own government, not the Marines.[3] The idea of developing popular support contrasted with the situation where Montagnards, hostile to the GVN but bonded to Army Special Forces, were neither pro-Communist nor pro-government.

When larger forces became available, limitations were still recognized. The operational concept was for the III Marine Amphibious Force[4] to work outward from the bases. In their interpretation of countering Mao's dictum that the guerilla must swim in the people as the fish swims in the sea, they hoped to turn the sea against the fish.

Their main device was the Combined Action Platoon, with a 15-man rifle squad and 34 local militia. Rather than having separate "advisory" units, the bulk of the CAP members served alongside the local militia, building personal relationships. It would "capture and hold" hamlets and villages. The Marines put heavy stress on honesty in local government, land reform (giving more to the peasants) and MEDCAP patrols that offered immediate medical assistance to villagers. [3] In some respects, the CAP volunteers had assignments similar to the much more highly trained United States Army Special Forces, but they would make use of whatever skills they had. One young Marine, for example, was a graduate of a high school in an agricultural area in the U.S., came from a family hog farm that went back several generations, and won competitions for teenagers who raised prized hogs. While he was no military expert, he was recognized as helping enormously with the critical pork production in villages.

Marines in CAP had the highest proportion of volunteering for successive Vietnam tours of any branch of the Marine Corps. Many villages considered the CAP personnel part of their extended family. Westmoreland distrusted the Marine village-oriented policy as too defensive for Phase II--only offense can win a war, he insisted. The official slogan about "winning hearts and minds" gave way to the Army's "Get the people by the balls, and their hearts and minds will follow." Ambassador Taylor welcomed the Marine strategy as the best solution for a basically political problem; it would also minimize American casualties.[5]

Special Forces and CIA

Another came from a joint project of the CIA and United States Army Special Forces. The CIDG (Civilian Irregular Defense Groups) program was created for the Montagnard peoples in the sparsely populated mountanous areas of the Central Highlands. The Montagnards disliked all Vietnamese, and had supported first the French, then the Americans. About 45,000 were enrolled in militias whose main role was defending their villages from the Communists. In 1970 the CIDG became part of the ARVN Rangers.[6]

Westmoreland asserts control over the Marines

By mid-January 1968, III MAF was the size of a U.S. corps, consisting of what amounted to two Army divisions, two reinforced Marine Divisions, a Marine aircraft wing, and supporting forces, numbering well over 100,000. GEN Westmoreland believed that Marine LTG Robert E. Cushman, Jr., who had relieved General Walt, was "unduly complacent."[7] worried about what he perceived as the Marine command's "lack of followup in supervision," its employment of helicopters, and its generalship. [8] Westmoreland sent his deputy Creighton Abrams to take command of I Corps, and gave his Air Force commander control of Marine aviation. The Marines protested vehemently but were rebuffed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. [9]

Marine LTG Victor Krulak devotes Chapter 13 of his memoirs to the dispute. [10] Douglas Kinnard also discusses the tension. [11]

GEN Cushman, formerly the III Marine Amphibious Corps commander in Vietnam and, in 1969, Commandant of the Marine Corps, [8] said "I felt, and I think that most Marines felt, that the time had come to get out of Vietnam."

References

  1. Mao Tse-tung (1967), On Protracted War, Foreign Languages Press, pp. 175-176
  2. United States Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Reprint of 1940 Edition)
  3. 3.0 3.1 Evans, D.L. Jr. (1974), USMC Civil Affairs in Vietnam: A PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY, The Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1973: An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography (Second Printing, 1985 ed.), History and Museums Division, United States Marine Corps, p. 316 Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "USMCanthology-Simmons98" defined multiple times with different content
  4. The normal Marine term is "Marine Expeditionary Force", but "Expeditionary" had unfortunate colonialist connotations in Vietnam. Current USMC terminology is MEF.
  5. David M. Berman, "Civic Action," in Spencer Tucker, ed. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War p. 73-74
  6. Tucker, ed., Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War (2000) pp 74-75, 276-77
  7. Westmoreland, William, A Soldier Reports
  8. 8.0 8.1 Shulimson, Jack, The Marine War: III MAF in Vietnam, 1965-1971, U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center,
  9. Westmoreland, William C. (1976), A Soldier Reports, pp 164-66
  10. Krulak, Victor, First to Fight, pp 195-204 online
  11. The War Managers American Generals Reflect on Vietnam, 1991, pp. 60-61